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This essay proposes an argument – on the face of it, both outlandish and paradoxical – that 
the violent upheavals of partition, which divided British India along religious lines, 
encouraged trends towards secularization in India and Pakistan. In the very months when 
the subcontinent was engulfed in religious conflict, both countries took significant steps to 
produce common institutions – indeed a common statecraft -- to manage mass migration 
and lawlessness across the new borders that divided them. I suggest this process 
secularized both states simultaneously in specific, admittedly partial, but remarkably 
similar, ways.   
 
This is not to claim, as others have done, that partition ‘solved’ the communal problem, by 
creating conditions in which, (at least in India), it was easier for ‘secularism’ to flourish.  I 
argue instead that the process of secularization occurred while communal attitudes 
remained pervasive, sometimes despite, and sometimes because of, extreme violence. I 
hope to show that in seeking to contain the threat that communal disorder posed to their 
ability to govern, elites at the helm in both countries took measures that secularized their 
approach to communalism, to religious communities and to the ‘enemy’ across the border. 
 
To make this case, I deploy a conception of ‘secularization’ that is supple, but not 
controversial.   I use the term to mean a tendency towards differentiation  -- not only 
                                                      
1 I am grateful to Humeira Iqtidar for persuading me to engage with the history of secularization. 
Her candid feedback helped me tighten the argument. Tanika Sarkar, and the participants of the 
workshop on secularization held at King’s College London in X, as well as the anonymous 
referees, have my gratitude for their helpful comments on an early draft. Simon Longstaff deserves 
warm thanks for his encouragement of these ideas at an embryonic stage. 
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between the secular spheres -- the state and the market  -- and the religious sphere, but also 
between state and society, society and the individual, and state and religious communities. 
This notion of secularization draws attention to the growing institutional autonomy of 
these ‘spheres’. In addition, it notes that internal differentiation and stratification within 
these separate spheres is a feature of secularization. ‘Secularization as differentiation’ is a 
concept that many sociologists have used and continue to find helpful: indeed, as Jose 
Casenova has famously stated, this thesis remains ‘the valid core of the theory of 
secularization’.2  
 
Periods of crisis and emergency, this essay proposes, can throw up conjunctures in which 
these separations are crystallised in one or more sphere3, encouraging forms of secular 
practice to emerge.  It suggests that in both Indian and Pakistan, the post-partition crisis 
was one such moment in the history of secularization. 
 
That the relationship between India and Pakistan after 1947 became mired in intractable 
conflict – as India pursued a policy of secularism, while Pakistan sought to build a state 
whose laws conformed to Islamic principles -- has long been a cornerstone in South Asian 
studies.4  Recently, however, this consensus, rock solid for decades, has begun to crumble. 
Scholars are coming to identify much ‘mutuality and cooperation’5 between the two states 
                                                      
2 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
1994, p.212.  Also see David Martin, On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory. 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company), 2005.   
3  I am not suggesting that the ‘state’ did in fact separate itself from ‘society’ in any simple sense.  
It will become clear below that I see this distinction rather as Timothy Mitchell does, as an internal 
(and often notional) border within the wider network of institutional mechanisms through which a 
social and political order is maintained. Timothy Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy and the State 
Effect’, in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 2006, p. 170.  
4 E.g. T.V. Paul, (ed.), The India-Pakistan Conflict.  An Enduring Rivalry, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 2005; Lars Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan.  The History of Unsolved Conflict.  
Volume I.  The Historical Part, (Odense: Odense University Press), 1998; Alistair Lamb, 
Incomplete Partition. The Genesis of India’s Kashmir Dispute, (Roxburg, 1997; Karachi: Oxford 
University Press) 2002; Sumit Ganguly, ‘Wars Without End: The Indo-Pakistani Conflict’, Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 541, September 1995. 
5 Joya Chatterji, ‘Mutuality and cooperation in South Asia: an alternative history of India-Pakistan 
relations’, (unpublished lecture, Royal Asiatic Society, March 2012, 
http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/03/joya-chatterji-an-alternative-history-of-india-pakistan-
relations). 
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in the aftermath of partition, whether in the areas of refugee relief and rehabilitation,6 
citizenship regimes,7 or inter-dominion relations.8 This essay builds upon this scholarship, 
but takes its conclusions in rather different directions.  In particular, it investigates the 
hesitant, but nonetheless significant, conformity of policy and practice in tackling 
borderlands and border-crossing in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  It regards these as 
processes by which, on both sides of the Radcliffe line, the state withdrew from its 
commitment to safeguarding the welfare of a particular religious community, in favour of 
policies that promoted order and stability more broadly.  In this process, it suggests, the 
authorities in both India and Pakistan began to regard (and perhaps construct) the interests 
of the post-colonial state itself, and also of property and the ‘private citizen’, as distinct 
from the interests of the ‘religious communities’ with which one or other ‘nation-state’ was 
(and to a great extent remained) strongly identified.  They also began to conceive of 
‘society’ as being an arena separate from ‘the state’. At these historical junctures, key 
actors on both sides took the view that the separation of the ‘state’ from ‘society’ was vital 
for the survival of both the ‘state’ and ‘society’. 
 
In focussing tightly on specific historical moments of post-colonial state formation, this 
essay, I am aware, might be seen as going against the grain of scholarship on the subject.  
That rich and illuminating body of work suggests that secularization (in the modern West) 
occurred slowly, over a period of centuries, as the result of complex societal change.9  My 
aim is not to challenge the gradualist account of secularization.  It is rather to investigate 
the relationship between ‘critical events’ and more leisurely historical transformations.  
The question it addresses is: what insights into that longer process of secularization can be 
gained from the perspective of ‘constitutive moments’?   
                                                      
6 Vazira F. Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, 
Boundaries, Histories, (New York, 2007); Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 
1946-1970’, The Historical Journal, 55, 4, (2012), pp. 1049-1071.  
 
7 Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship’.  
 
8 Pallavi Raghavan, ‘The Finality of Partition: Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 
1947-1957’, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2012; Kanti Bajpai 
Pervaiz I. Cheema, S. Ganguly, P. R. Chari, S. P. Cohen (eds), Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception 
and Management of Crisis in South Asia, (New Delhi: Barnes and Noble), 1995.  
 
9 The classic statement of this position is set out in Charles Taylor’s magisterial work, A Secular 
Age, (Cambridge Mass.: Bellnap of Harvard University Press), 2007. 
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In periods of crisis, the essay suggests, trends and tendencies with long histories can 
rapidly crystallise into new institutional practices with a wider secularising impulse. But it 
shows, too, that that these new institutions did not always survive, and when they did, their 
foundations often remained insecure.  Reversals were as significant as gains, and 
incoherence was more common than ideological unity of purpose.  In other words, while 
secularization might appear (from the comfortable distance of hindsight) to have been a 
seamless, unilinear process with powerful philosophical underpinnings, looked at from up 
close, it proves to have been formed by more fragile moments, with tenuous outcomes and 
uncertain directions. By looking closely historical moments during which, metaphorically 
speaking, the hyphen between the (religious)‘nation’ and the ‘state’ was partly erased, and 
the interests of the state took precedence of the nation (and the national ‘community’), this 
essay draws attention to trends towards secularization that are hardly discernible, and have 
rarely been discussed, but which, I argue, call to be better understood. 
 
 
The paper analyses two such junctures, both at the earliest stages of the development of 
‘third world’ diplomacy.  Both case studies concern the management of the eastern and 
western frontiers, respectively, between India and Pakistan. One of my examples is drawn 
from the highest levels of India-Pakistan diplomacy, at the moment of its very ‘birth’; the 
other is based on evidence garnered at local levels, to do with everyday policing of the new 
border that separated the two countries. These cases proved to have fascinating and 
surprising inter-connections. Historians of India’s partition take the view that ‘partition in 
the east’ was fundamentally different from ‘partition in the west’, a consensus to which my 
own work has contributed.10  The two cases looked at below challenged my assumptions 
and throw a different light on partition studies as a whole.  But there is also a remarkable 
‘sub-text’.  Teasing that out, as I try to do in this essay, reveals much about the history of 
secularization in South Asia. 
 
                                                      
10 E.g. Joya Chatterji, 'Rights or charity? Government and refugees: the debate over relief and 
rehabilitation in West Bengal, 1947-1950', in Suvir Kaul (ed.), Partition of memory, (Delhi: 
Permanent Black Press, 2001); and Joya Chatterji, The spoils of partition.  Bengal and India 1947-
1967, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press) 2007. Also see Ranabir Samaddar (ed.), 
Reflections on partition in the east, (New Delhi and Calcutta: Vikas Publishing House and Calcutta 
Research Group, 1997). 
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 I  
 
 
In several important respects, Radcliffe’s borders were governed differently in the east and 
the west.  To summarise briefly a deeply complex history: in August 1947, in the west, the 
two governments and their armies became involved in the rescue and transfer of minority 
populations11 and the recovery of abducted women.12  India committed troops to arrange 
the evacuation of Hindu and Sikh minorities from Pakistan,13 and created a special unit to 
track down and recover Hindu and Sikh women abducted by Muslim men.14  Pakistan did 
the same for Muslim refugees and abductees. These arrangements were intended to apply 
to both parts of the divided Punjab. But after the September 1947 riots in Delhi, and mass 
exoduses across north India and Sind,15 the Punjab agreements had to be extended first to 
Delhi; and, following the anti-Meo pogroms that Ian Copland and Shail Mayaram have 
described, to Bharatpur, Alwar and Bikaner.16  After troubles broke out in Sind and Bihar, 
these rules began to be applied there too,17 and were extended to the princely state of 
Hyderabad after India’s ‘police action’ in 1948.18 
                                                      
11Robin Jeffrey, ‘The Punjab Boundary Force and the problem of order, 1947’, Modern Asian 
Studies, 8,4 (1974); Tahir Kamran, ‘The unfolding crisis in Punjab, March-August, 1947: key 
turning points and British responses’, Journal of Punjab Studies, 14, (2007), pp. 187-210. 
 
12E.g. Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders and boundaries: women in India's partition, (New 
Delhi, 1998).   
 
13 Rajendra Prasad to Patel, 10 September 1947; and Patel's reply to Prasad, 12 September 1947, 
Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s correspondence, (10 vols, Ahmedabad, 1971) (SPC), iv, pp. 340-
41. 
14Government of India (GOI), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), CAP Branch/F.8-CAP(AP)48. 
15 I have used throughout the contemporary (1948-50) spellings of place names, which 
subsequently changed several times, to avoid confusion.  
16 Ian Copland, ‘The further shores of Partition: Ethnic Cleansing in Rajasthan 1947’, Past and 
Present, No. 160 (August, 1998), pp. 203-239; Shail Mayaram, ‘Speech, Silence and the Making of 
Partition Violence in Mewat’, in Shahid Amin and Dipesh Chakravarty (eds.), Subaltern studies X, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press), 1996.  
17 Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship’. The regions where the rules applied were 
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At this point, India took measures to discourage the return home of evacuees of the 
‘wrong’ religious denomination: first, by introducing a permit system in June 1948,19 and 
then, by draconian ordinances in 1949, taking over the property of all Muslim evacuees 
from ‘the affected areas’ – now extended to include all of India, except West Bengal, 
Assam and Tripura -- who were deemed to have migrated to Pakistan.20 The evacuee 
property of Muslims was then deployed by the government of India as the cornerstone of 
its projects to house and rehabilitate Hindu and Sikh refugees.21 Soon afterwards, Pakistan 
followed suit, taking over abandoned Hindu and Sikh property in western Pakistan for 
allocation to Muslim refugees.22  By threatening would-be migrants with dispossession, 
these reciprocal measures stabilised populations and stemmed the massive flows of 
refugees that had challenged the capacity of the state to handle and absorb these people 
both in north, western, and south India and in west Pakistan.  They produced a relatively 
impervious border between the two countries in the west, across which flows came to be 
strictly regulated.  Later, the diplomatic corps of both countries were charged with 
exercising oversight over the welfare of ‘their’ minorities in the ‘other’ country.23  
 
 
So in western Pakistan, as well as in large parts of north, western and southern India, the 
two states evolved policies for the welfare of refugees, evacuees and abductees which were 
                                                                                                                                                                      
known as the ‘agreed areas’. Ilyas Chattha, Partition and locality: violence, migration, and 
development in Gujranwala and Sialkot 1947-1961, Karachi: OUP Pakistan, 2011.  
18 Taylor C. Sherman, ‘Migration, citizenship and belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan), 1946–1956’, 
Modern Asian Studies, 45, (2011), pp. 81-107; Taylor C. Sherman, Muslim Belonging in Secular 
India: Negotiating Citizenship in Postcolonial Hyderabad, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015.  
 
19 GOI/ Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)/ F. 6/62/48-FI; GOI/MEA/F.21/48-Pak I; 
GOI/MEA/F.2-1/48-Pak I; Zamindar, The Long Partition; Chatterji, ‘South Asian histories of 
citizenship’. 
20 ‘An ordinance to provide for the administration of evacuee property and for certain matters 
connected therewith’, Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, The Gazette of India, 18 October 1949, 
GOI/MEA F. 17-39/49-AFRI. 
 
21  (India) Act XXXXIV of 1954, 9 October 1954. 
22 GOI/MEA/F.11-21/49-Pak III/ Secret 
23 GOI/MEA/F.12-16/49-Pak A; Chatterji, ‘South Asian histories of citizenship’.  
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reciprocal, but which nonetheless identified each of them strongly with the interests of the 
particular community (or communities) at the core of their conception of nationhood.  In 
the immediate aftermath of partition, it was Hindu women, Hindu property, Hindu refugees 
and Hindu and Sikh minorities whom India sought to protect. Pakistan did the same for 
Muslims.  Scholars have remarked, rightly, upon the implications of these policies for 
national identity, citizenship and belonging on both sides of the Radcliffe line.24 
 
But there were large, and significant, exceptions to these rules.  In Pakistan, the entire 
eastern wing (‘East Bengal’, latterly ‘East Pakistan’), which made up a majority of 
Pakistan’s entire population, was left out of these arrangements.  In India, three entire 
provinces -- West Bengal, Assam and Tripura -- were excluded. In concert, India and 
Pakistan agreed to adopt a very different policy towards cross-border migrants across the 
entire eastern region of the subcontinent than they had established in the west. The border 
here, they agreed, was to be left porous.  There would be no state-assisted evacuation of 
refugees.  The vacant property of emigrant minorities would not be deployed for the 
rehabilitation of incoming refugees. Instead, it would be held in trust for its original 
owners and managed by special Evacuee Property Management Boards, set up specifically 
for this purpose.25  Incoming refugees would largely be left to fend for themselves.  
 
These policies might be described in some senses as secular.  In contrast to the west, in the 
east, the state in both India and Pakistan appeared to dissociate itself from their 
responsibilities towards ‘core’ national (but religiously defined) communities which had 
fled  - in both directions - across the eastern borders in search of shelter.  
 
How do we make sense of these arrangements, which taken together, produced the 
specificities of ‘partition in the east’?26  Might they be understood as efforts by the state to 
                                                      
24 Zamindar, The Long Partition; Chatterji, ‘South Asian histories of citizenship’; Menon and 
Bhasin, Borders and boundaries; Raghavan, ‘The Finality of Partition’;  Sherman, ‘Migration, 
citizenship and belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan); Taylor C. Sherman,  Muslim Belonging in 
Secular India. Negotiating Citizenship in Postcolonial India, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016.  
 
25 Chatterji, ‘Rights or charity?’; Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives. Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in 
India and Pakistan, 1947-65, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), 2013.  
 
26Ranabir Samaddar (ed.), Reflections on Partition in the East, (New Delhi and Calcutta: Vikas 
Publishing House and Calcutta Research Group, 1997). 
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step back from the arena of ‘community’, and hence as a form of secularization?  And if 
this occurred, how and why did it come about?  How did the participants in these processes 
understand or justify them? 
 
Fortunately, a detailed record of the first Inter-Dominion conference between India and 
Pakistan in Calcutta in April 1948, at which the representatives of India and Pakistan 
hammered out these arrangements, has survived.  Rather like the scribes in a court of law, 
a small army of stenographers recorded every single word that was spoken at the 
conference, over the course of three days, in Calcutta’s Writers’ Building.  This transcript, 
only recently released for scholarly scrutiny, yields a fly-on-the-wall view of Indo-Pakistan 
diplomacy at this embryonic stage of that relationship.  But more importantly for our 
purposes here, it also gives a hint of why this new policy for the east, so different from that 
recently adopted in the north and west of the subcontinent, appealed to policy-makers on 
both sides.  
  
Before addressing this source in detail, some background information is needed to grasp its 
full significance. By December 1947, the Military Evacuation Organisation, established in 
September, had rescued and evacuated most of the refugees stranded in the two Punjabs. A 
semblance of order was returning to the divided Punjab, to Delhi and to the towns and 
villages of the north and west of the subcontinent that had witnessed the worst violence. To 
the relief of government on both sides, the huge migrations in the west of the subcontinent 
appeared to have ceased.  It seemed that the crisis was finally over.   
But no sooner had things begun to settle down in the north-western tracts when trouble 
broke out in the east.  In the summer of 1947, Calcutta and its surrounding townships had 
remained tense but largely peaceful.27  Yet despite the uneasy calm, over a million Hindu 
refugees from eastern Bengal had made their way across the border to Calcutta between 
August and December 1947 and perhaps half as many Muslims had fled from West 
Bengal, Assam and Bihar and crossed the border into East Bengal.28 In February 1948, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
27 Although see Ishan Mukherjee, 'Agitations, Riots and the Transitional State in Calcutta, 1945-
50'. Cambridge University PhD dissertation, 2017, who makes a strong case for continued, if low-
grade, violence, throughout the period in Calcutta. 
28 Chakravarty, The Marginal Men; Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition.  Bengal and India, 
1947-67, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 2007;  A. F. M. Kamaluddin, ‘Refugee 
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however, localised violence sparked off fresh exoduses across the eastern border between 
India and Pakistan.  Soon after, the Standstill Agreement between India and Pakistan on 
trade broke down, after Pakistan decided to impose an export levy on jute.29  On 1 March 
1948, the two countries declared ‘each other [to be] foreign country as regards customs and 
excise duty.’30  Tensions escalated in the two Bengals and Assam, and frightened people of 
the minority communities once again began in to flee their homes in search of security.   
 
This was the context in which the first Inter-Dominion Conference was held in Calcutta in 
April 1948.  This conference was quite different from the numerous previous meetings that 
had been held to discuss arrangements about refugees in the Punjab. There agreement 
between India and Pakistan had been achieved within the joint institutional structures 
established by the Partition Council, with the meetings chaired by Auchinleck or by 
Mountbatten.  The Calcutta Inter-Dominion conference was, in this sense, the first properly 
‘international’ encounter between the leaders of India and Pakistan, at which delegates 
from the two countries faced each other across the table without a British Viceroy or his 
deputy in the chair; and this in the broader context where a new international order was 
just beginning to emerge,31 and widespread scepticism about the prospects of Asia’s two 
newest countries surviving as sovereign states.32  
At Calcutta, K. C. Neogy and Ghulam Mohammad, Refugee Rehabilitation Ministers of 
India and Pakistan respectively, led the two delegations. The Indian deputation also 
included Syama Prasad Mookerjee (then Cabinet Minister for Industry and Supply) and Sri 
Prakasa (the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan) as well as the Chief Ministers of West 
Bengal (Dr B. C. Roy) and Assam (Gopinath Bardoloi).  Pakistan’s team included Khwaja 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Problems in Bangladesh’, in L. A. Kosinski and K. M. Elahi (eds), Population Redistribution and 
Development in South Asia, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing), 1985.  
 
29 V. V. S.Tyagi, ‘The Economic Impact of Partition on Indian Agriculture and Related Industries’, 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, American University, Washington DC, 1958. 
30 Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan, p. 135. 
 
31 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace:  The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2013;  Raghavan, ‘The Finality of 
Partititon’. 
32 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press) 1967. 
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Nazimuddin (Chief Minister of East Bengal), and Hamidul Huq Choudhury (East Bengal’s 
Minister for Finance, Commerce, Labour & Industries, later to become the third Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan.)  Politicians of longstanding for the most part, these men inevitably 
had elite backgrounds --  B. C. Roy was a wealthy society doctor in Calcutta, Sir Ghulam 
Mohammad, an Aligarh alumnus, had been Accountant for the Ministry of Finance; 
Khwaja Nazimuddin, a prosperous landlord, was a scion of the Nawab of Dhaka’s family; 
Syama Prasad Mookerjee, son of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, had been called to the bar at 
Lincoln’s Inn, and went on to become the youngest Vice Chancellor of Calcutta 
University. But few of these men had worked for government (Ghulam Muhammad was an 
exception in this regard) and none of them had any experience of international 
negotiations. 
The agenda before them was ‘to discuss the causes of the present exodus of non-Muslims 
from Eastern Pakistan and Muslims from West Bengal and action necessary to create 
conditions in Eastern Pakistan and West Bengal which will make it possible for non-
Muslims and Muslims respectively to continue to live there’; and  ‘To discuss steps 
necessary to induce evacuees from Eastern Pakistan and West Bengal to return home and 
other ancillary action’.33 The agenda makes it plain that neither government felt able to 
cope with another exchange of population on the scale of Punjab, and each wanted to head 
off the looming crisis before it was engulfed by another tide of refugees. 
 Thus, the common goal for the delegates from India and Pakistan was to agree on ways to 
restore order on both sides of the border, which in turn would persuade members of 
minority communities in East and West Bengal to stay on where they were, and encourage 
evacuees who had already fled to go back to their homes.  The verbatim transcript gives us 
a candid camera of the conference, and see how both sides went about the business of 
producing peace.  
 
Reading through the transcript, the reaction of the historian is just how remarkable it was 
that they succeeded. Minutes after the conference began, members of the two delegations 
                                                      
33 ‘Proceedings of the Inter-Dominion Conference held at 2.15 p.m. on the 18th April, 1948, at the 
Writers’ Buildings, Calcutta’, GOI/MEA/ Pak-I Branch, File No. 8-15/48. 
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reacted with rage when the subject of Muslim migrants forced to leave Assam was first 
mentioned34: 
 
‘The Hon’ble H.H. Choudhury:  Let the [Assam] Government not force 
[Muslims]out. 
 
The Hon’ble Mr Bardoloi:  I am not forcing anybody out.  If you go on 
talking like this, I refuse to take part in this conference. 
  
The Hon’ble Mr. Ghulam Muhammad: Then let us agree that pending the 
discussion at the next Inter-Dominion Conference Assam government will 
not do anything to force the immigrants out… 
  
The Hon’ble Mr Bardoloi: I do not agree to that.... 
  
The Hon’ble Mr Ghulam Muhammad: We are trying to give and take and 
not dictate. 
 
The Hon’ble Mr Neogy: Then we better call a separate inter-dominion 
conference. 
 
The Hon’ble Mr Ghulam Muhammad: Let the resolution be like this:  It is 
recommended that a separate inter-Dominion conference should be called 
at an early date … to discuss the question of migration of Muslims from East 
Bengal to Assam ….  Pending this conference both sides agree not to take 
any action to force or precipitate exodus on a mass scale from one province 
to the other. 
                                                      
34 Since the late nineteenth century, Muslim peasants from Bengal, chiefly from Mymensingh 
district, had begun to migrate in increasing numbers up the Brahmaputra river into Assam, and 
colonize empty land in the Brahmaputra valley for agriculture.   Haraprasad Chattopadhyay, 
Internal Migration in India: A Case Study of Bengal, (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi), 1987. Tensions had 
begun to rise between local Assamese people and the Bengali migrants in the 1930s, escalating 
sharply in the 1940s when the Congress and the Muslim League became involved in the issue.  
Amalendu Guha, Planter-Raj to Swaraj. Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam, 1826-
1946 (New Delhi: ICHR), 1977. The conflict had assumed ethnic and communal dimensions well 
before the partition of India, but these were exacerbated after 1947. GOI/MEA/F.39-
NEF/47/Secret.  Also see Jayeeta Sharma, Empire’s Garden. Assam and the Making of India, 
(Duke University Press: Durham and London), 2011. 
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The Hon’ble Mr Neogy: Let us get on with the rest of the work.35 
 
In effect, both sides decided to shelve for the time being talking about issues in Assam that 
so infuriated members, Indian and Pakistani alike, in order to get on with ‘the rest of the 
work’.  They achieved this by separating the Assam question from all the others that had to 
be addressed.  What had previously been seen as a single ‘communal’ question, conceived 
as being a conflict between monolithic ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ communities, was thus 
broken down (or differentiated) into discrete, regionally defined, questions, each requiring 
a distinct approach.36 
Indeed, deferral was a device that the delegates used more than once when the conference 
ran into troubled waters.  When matters came up that prompted one or other incensed 
delegate to threaten to walk out, the other members quickly agreed to put the matter off, to 
be discussed at a future conference.  This was in interesting tactic (and one that was 
frequently deployed at subsequent Indo-Pakistan negotiations), because it assumed - and 
thus laid the basis for - continued dialogue.  It presumed that the two sides would continue 
to talk to each other, and settle differences between themselves through discussion, albeit 
at some later date. It also ensured that in these ways, the agenda for a future conference, 
and further dialogue, had been mutually established.   
But at another level, the deployment of this tactic can be seen as a secularization of the 
process. By disaggregating ‘communal’ issues into separate parts, by postponing the 
discussion of matters about which delegates were ‘passionate’ (as opposed to reasoned and 
‘rational’), and by first settling matters over which the two sides had achieved (in a 
Rawlsian sense) a kind of ‘overlapping consensus’, the two delegations were creating a 
secular practice of international diplomacy that would endure well beyond the crisis of 
1948.37  
                                                      
35 Proceedings of the Inter-Dominion Conference, 16-18 April, 1948, at the Writers’ Buildings, 
Calcutta’, GOI/MEA/ Pak-I Branch, File No. 8-15/48. Emphasis added. 
 
36 The fact that Ghulam Muhammad had experience as a public servant in the Railways in British 
India may or may not be relevant to his readiness to agree a solution to the problem.  Neogy had no 
such experience.  
37 Raghavan, ‘The Finality of Partition’. 
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Substantial agreement was even more swiftly achieved once delegates began to speak to 
each other quite openly as members of the same social class, with common material 
interests, and a common stake in a mutually beneficial settlement.  One such instance was 
settling the scope of the proposed Evacuee Property Management Boards.   
Again, a word of clarification will be useful here.  The two sides had intended to set up 
these Boards, as their name suggests, for the express purpose of protecting and managing 
the property of distressed evacuees who had abandoned their homes during the riots. Both 
governments were clear that it was imperative to restore the confidence of minorities if 
they were to prevent another mass exodus on the scale of Punjab, and to persuade those 
who had fled to return home.   To ensure these twin purposes, H. M. Patel - a model career 
bureaucrat on the Indian side38- proposed that the rather general term, ‘minority’, in the 
proposed agreement be replaced with the word ‘evacuee’, which, by this time, had 
acquired a very specific legal meaning.   
H. M. Patel had represented India on the steering committee that had dealt with these 
issues in the west, so he knew well that this was a critically important distinction.  
Precedents in the Punjab and the north west had established that the word ‘evacuee’ meant 
quite specifically those who held fled from one country to the other during the troubles and 
had abandoned property in the land of their birth and residence.  But most delegates -- 
who were surprisingly ill-informed about what had happened in the Punjab -- 
misunderstood Patel’s intent. The exchange which followed is funny as well as telling:  
 
The Hon’ble Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury: I have got some property in 
Kalimpong [in Indian West Bengal].  Will this Committee manage that 
property? 
 
The Hon’ble Mr Neogy: Yes, certainly. …. Do not discriminate between 
the different classes of people we have in view…I know of any numbers of 
                                                      
38 H. M. Patel, graduate of St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, and a distinguished member of the 
Indian Civil Service, served until 1950 as cabinet secretary to the Ministry for Home Affairs under 
Vallabhbhai Patel in 1946. He worked with Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, the future Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, on the implementation of partition. He was the head of the Emergency Committee 
administering Delhi during the outbreak of violence in September 1947. He continued as one of 
India's highest-ranking civil servants until 1959. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 26 August 2004. 
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landlords and businessmen who have never crossed the [River] Padma, 
although they own property in East Bengal.   
 
The Hon’ble Mr. Ghulam Muhammad: We are considering here [how] to 
safeguard the property of those people who have left against their wishes. 
You want to bring in all sorts of people. … 
 
The Hon’ble Mr Neogy: I have some personal property. 
 
The Hon’ble Mr Ghulam Muhammad: Men like you would have served us in 
a higher position and we are being deprived of that benefit.  So we think 
these cases should be punished! (Laughter).39 
 
Not surprisingly, this was quickly agreed among fellow landlords, despite H.M. Patel’s 
quiet protest. The Evacuee Property Management Boards, which had been established to 
protect the abandoned homes only of genuine evacuees, would now extend their 
jurisdiction to all property owners who belonged to the minority community, whether or 
not they had actually set foot in these estates, and regardless of whether they were actually 
evacuees or not.  The Boards would thus be empowered to act as state-backed estate 
managers for large private landowners who were in fact not evacuees, at a time when 
private property everywhere had been rendered insecure.  Once again, we see the delegates 
retreat from a commitment to specifically communal welfare, to a pursuit of beneficial 
arrangements for propertied groups on both sides.  This is an interesting example of how 
private interests worked with and through the state to buttress both themselves and the 
state’s secular authority, while appearing to create official institutions (the Boards) sharply 
distinct from society.40   
A similar drift is perceptible in the discussion of measures to alleviate the ‘economic 
boycott and strangulation’ of vulnerable minority groups.  These measures were intended 
to alleviate the hardship faced by vulnerable persons who were left behind, (such as, for 
example, Hindu goalas or milkmen in East Bengal who had earned their livelihoods by 
selling milk locally, or Muslim artisans in West Bengal,) who faced economic boycott by 
                                                      
39 ‘Proceedings of the Inter-Dominion Conference’.  Emphasis added. 
40 Also see Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy and State Effect’, p. 175.  
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members of the majority community.  Instead, the discussion quickly turned to cases, on 
both sides, of ‘unfair’ and ‘excessive’ income-tax demands levied upon individual (and 
famously wealthy) members of those minority communities. Some of them happened to be 
delegates at the conference.41  Once again, there was much laughter and mutual leg-
pulling, references to common acquaintances who had fallen foul of the taxman, and jokes 
about rapacious Finance Ministers. (‘The Hon’ble Mr Nazimuddin: You don’t know what 
the Finance Ministers have [up] their sleeves!’)  Not surprisingly, it did not take long for 
the two sides to achieve ‘absolute agreement in the matter’42. By the end of the first day of 
the conference, the parties who had started out at each others’ throats as angry spokesmen 
of violated and embattled rival communities were acting as ‘rational, sociable agents who 
meant to collaborate in peace to their mutual benefit.’43  
Signficantly, both sides also helped diffuse any remaining tensions by distancing 
themselves (and the wider social class to which they all belonged) from any responsibility 
for the communal violence and discrimination against the minorities in both countries.  
The delegates insisted that it was people lower down the social scale, Hindus and Muslims 
alike, who were to blame for the mess.  As Hamidul Huq Choudhury put it, ‘nobody 
occupying high position can ever think of molesting or injuring the interests of the 
minorities… It is generally the petty officers who being misled by a false patriotic feelings 
[who] are responsible for all this mischief…’. This theme crops up again and again, and at 
later conferences as well – the idea that it was lowly functionaries at the bottom of the food 
chain who spread the ‘contagion’ of communalism, while their enlightened superiors 
looked on in horror.  Also interesting here is the reference to ‘false patriotic feeling’, 
presumably the passionate and irrational attachment towards the nation or community felt 
by the lower ranks, in contrast to the sensibly measured attitude of the elites to their 
respective communal affiliations.  There was also a tendency on both sides of the table to 
blame some refugees for their own plight – those impoverished and in distress (as opposed, 
presumably, to the wealthiest, who had managed to transfer many of their assets in good 
time): ‘It is only some people who have gone from the Indian Union and who are 
                                                      
41 Khwaja Nazimuddin had considerable landed property spread over many districts.  Hamidul Huq 
Choudhury and K.C. Neogy also had substantial landed interests.  
42‘Proceedings of the Inter-Dominion Conference’.  
 
43 Charles Taylor, The Secular Age, p.159. 
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themselves in difficulty about their own prospects, who are irritated for the sufferings they 
have undergone- it is they who are contributing… to the problem.’44   
By the evening of the second day of the conference, the delegates appeared to be relaxing 
into a mood of mutual trust and good-humoured ease.  Indeed, at several points that 
afternoon, they appear to have forgotten that they were at a serious international meeting 
and not at a social occasion in the company of friends and social equals. That night, the 
when the meeting broke off for dinner, the serious business was all done, bar the shouting 
– which was no longer the order of the day. The conference ended early the next day, 
several hours before the appointed time.  
Yet all the laughter and bonhomie should not blind us to the very serious decisions that 
were made at this conference.  (See Appendix 1).  Nor should we avoid recognizing how – 
at a time of great tension and conflict – these decisions came to be agreed.  First, both sides 
believed that it was imperative for their respective state’s survival to do everything they 
could to stem cross-border flows. Second, individual members of both delegations believed 
that the restoration of order and the security of property was vital to their own interests, 
and that of their social class.  If, in order to achieve this greater good, they had to retreat 
from commitments to the welfare of their more vulnerable co-religionists who had already 
fled their homes and were reluctant to return, so be it: that was the price they were 
prepared to pay.   
Third, arriving at agreement had required the delegates to take a view about who was 
responsible for the violence against minorities on both sides of the border.  They quickly 
agreed it was not themselves, or members of the wider social stratum to which they 
belonged.  They distanced themselves from the ‘unfortunate’ actions of ‘misguided’ (or 
‘irrational’) actions of their inferiors, on whom they placed the blame. They 
simultaneously and rhetorically separated the ‘community’ into two groups – the 
enlightened elite (to which they themselves belonged) and whose interests were closely 
aligned with the interests of both states in the restoration of order; and the unenlightened 
popular classes, who had been swayed by the passions of misguided ‘patriotic’ and 
communal fervour, and who were the cause of disorder. They also, as we have seen, 
disaggregated the ‘communal question’ into discrete local and regional questions.  These 
                                                      
44‘Proceedings of the Inter-Dominion Conference’. Emphasis added. 
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processes of simultaneous (though not necessarily intellectually coherent) differentiation 
helped to secularise a space and a moment, and that in turn allowed the Calcutta agreement 
– which would have profound and complex legacies -- to be signed. 
But it is also noteworthy that all of this happened without anyone professing any 
ideological commitment to ‘secularism’.  Indeed, we can presume that at least some of the 
delegates (such as the Hindu nationalist Syama Prasad Mookerjee and K. C. Neogy on the 
Indian side, and possibly Nazimuddin for Pakistan45), if tested, would have protested that 
far from being committed secularists, they were in favour of giving religious values a 
prominent role in shaping state institutions, and indeed, international relations.  
Yet so much was agreed, by so many, with so little needing to be said, through jokes and 
teasing asides that all the delegates immediately seemed to understand. Hence in order to 
understand how secularising institutions were created by religious men at the Calcutta 
conference, we have perhaps to fall back on Bordieu’s notion of habitus: the un-examined 
and shared predispositions, or common-sense assumptions, about the ‘obvious’ good, of 
members of a post-colonial elite who arrived at the much the same conclusions from 
different starting points – and achieved an ‘overlapping consensus’ - without necessarily 
knowing how or why.  This also might throw some light on the tricky question of how 
long-term societal change impacted upon a discrete governmental (and inter-governmental) 
process of decision-making. What we are observing, perhaps, were the outcome of long-
term changes that had predisposed South Asian elites, whether Hindu or Muslim, Indian or 
Pakistani, to understand ‘the obvious good’ in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
45 Chowdhury had played a key role in presenting the Muslim case before Sir Cyril Radcliffe, and 
was not at this point in his life well known for a conciliatory approach towards India.  Hamidul 
Huq Chowdhury, Memoirs, Dacca: Halima Hamid Trust, 1989. For his part, Mookerjee would soon 
resign from Cabinet and famously demand that India go to war with Pakistan.  
 18 
 
II 
Once this key idea is given its due, it should no longer come as a surprise that the 
apparently intractable disputes over jute which had threatened trade between India and 
Pakistan in March 1948 were settled at a new trade agreement in May 194846; and that in 
the matter of minority rights and refugee rehabilitation, the two countries went on to 
produce a whole series of entirely identical laws and regulations, in tandem (See Appendix 
II).  
Nor should it surprise us to find that after Calcutta, the same logic would be extended to 
other regions and other areas of governance.  Soon afterwards, both sides would begin 
actively to cooperate with the other, first to realize, and then to bolster, the sovereignty of 
its counterpart in the western border zones.  
After the exchange of populations had been ‘completed’ across the western border, the 
border itself remained largely undefined, un-demarcated and unsettled. This came to be a 
worrying issue for both governments, particularly where the border cut through sparsely 
inhabited, and poorly policed, desert tracts. Before December 1948, India and Pakistan had 
authorized the Inspectors General of Police in East and West Punjab, the epicentre of the 
troubles, to devise common measures ‘to bring under control the border incidents between 
the two states’.47 But in 1949, a new series of arrangements were put into place for the 
police forces of the two countries to co-operate in managing ‘ordinary’ crime in remote 
border areas, well beyond the killing fields of the Punjab.  A new problem had arisen, 
becoming marked by the winter of 1948: policemen on both sides began to report 
increasingly frequent cross-border raids, particularly along the border between Bikaner, 
Jodhpur and Jaisalmer on the Indian side, and Bahawalpur, Khairpur and Sind in Pakistan.  
Men on horseback (often dressed in police or army uniforms) would come sweeping across 
the border and loot isolated villages on the other side, retreating with their booty across the 
border. In one typical incident on 12 November 1948, the police reported that ‘at 5 pm 
about 150 armed Muslims consisting of pathans from Bahawalpur state raided village 
Khilliwala on the border of Bikaner state’.  The raiders, who were armed, broke up into 
                                                      
46 Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan, p. 135.  
47 NAI/MEA/27-16/49 Pak III. 
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three groups and encircled the village, attacking the villagers and ‘looting the whole 
village to their hearts’ content’. Eleven armed policemen of the princely state of Bikaner 
were stationed in the village, but most of them fled when the first shots were fired. Two 
people were killed. The residents of this village, and four neighbouring villages on the 
Indian side, abandoned their homes.48  By 1950, the Inspector General of the Sind Police 
reported that 168 incidents of this sort had taken place, most of them concentrated in the 
sector between Khokropar and Gadro.  ‘It was obvious that these raids have become 
common since partition’, he reported, ‘and were a regular menace to both sides.’  His 
Indian counterpart, the Inspector General of the Rajasthan Police, agreed with him, 
reporting 193 similar incidents in Rajasthan alone.  ‘He stressed the raiders in several 
instances came in uniform and equipped with modern weapons’. 49 
Preserved in the archives is a fascinating set of reports of these meetings, at which 
measures to manage and contain these raids were agreed by local policemen from the 
affected zones of India and Pakistan.  These reveal the depth and range of the ‘overlapping 
consensus’  – often at humble and quotidian levels – between the two countries across a 
whole range of questions.  But for our purpose here, what is significant is the gradual shift 
in the police’s perception of these raids.  
To begin with, the local police viewed these raids in unequivocally communal terms. So, 
for instance, in their first report on the Khilliwala incident, described above, the police 
insisted that the perpetrators were ‘150 Muslims’, without any evidence to support that 
claim.  Less than three months later, in respect of an almost identical incident on 5 
February 1949, in which five people were murdered in the village of Ragri (also in 
Bikaner), the police were a little more agnostic about the religious affiliation of the 
perpetrators, describing them simply as ‘Pakistanis’. By the time the Chief Secretary 
reported the event, he cautiously described the raiders as ‘alleged Pakistanis’. 50    
                                                      
48 Extract from Daily Situation Report dated 20 November 1948, from the Central Intelligence 
Office, Ajmer, NAI/MEA/36-15/49 Pak III.  
49 ‘Minutes of the border conference held in the office of the S.P. Sind C.I.D Karachi on 13 
October 1950 at 15.30 hours’, ibid.   
50 Telegram no. 940 dated 7 February 1949, from Chief Secretary, Bikaner State, to Prime Minister, 
Bikaner. NAI/MEA/36-15/49 Pak III. Emphasis added. 
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Gradually, over the next twelve months or so, officials increasingly began to see these 
raids as secular crimes against persons and property. They made fewer and fewer 
assumptions about either the communal (or national) identity, or communal motives, of the 
raiders.  Instead, they began to refer to the perpetratrators in the more traditional language 
of colonial policing,51 as ‘bad characters’.52  They spoke of the fact that ‘people residing 
within easy reach of the border in both India and Pakistan [were] very closely connected’.  
Indian and Pakistani officers agreed that ‘there [were] certainly some undesirable 
characters on both sides who encourage[d] the commission of many forms of crime, 
including dacoity, robbery and cattle theft.’ They recognised that they had to work together 
to police these ‘badmashes’53. 
The police also increasingly distinguished between the majority of ‘law abiding citizens’ 
who were ‘naturally disturbed’ by these crimes, and the ‘bad characters’ who committed 
them.54  Both sides agreed on the importance ‘for the Police on both sides to exchange lists 
giving names and necessary particulars of such persons to ensure that all are suitably dealt 
with’.55  The criminals were thus understood as individuals, with names and personal 
particulars, rather than as innominate representatives of entire communities. Their crimes 
were viewed as secular crimes (robbery, dacoity, cattle-theft) against ‘law abiding 
citizens’.  The victims of crime, too, were simultaneously secularized: they were seen as 
upright, individual, property-owning members of ‘the public’ or ‘society’, rather than as a 
part of an homogenous and united, but essentially faceless, community/nation. 
 
This is not to suggest that the police or administration in the area abandoned a communal 
view of identity, or of national belonging.  They did not.  We see this plainly in the 
exchanges between the Chief Commissioner of Kutch and the Government of India at the 
                                                      
51 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, ‘Customs of Governance: Colonialism and Democracy in Twentieth 
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centre on the wisdom of extending to Kutch the mutually agreed cross-border policing 
arrangements set out in Appendix III. Kutch, a sparsely populated region situated on the 
Indian side of the western border between India and Pakistan,56 had a large number of 
Muslims. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch reported that no similar incident had ever 
occurred in Kutch, so extending these arrangements to Kutch was unnecessary.  Moreover, 
he argued, to do so represented a real threat to India’s national security, as ‘the population 
on our side of the border [being] mostly Muslim… [it] cannot be relied upon in times of 
emergency’.  He concluded that ‘it would not be advisable to allow any Pakistani officer to 
visit Kutch and get an idea of the existing conditions in Kutch’.57 His implication was 
clear: Kutchi Muslims were not reliable and their loyalty to India was uncertain; and if a 
Pakistani officer got wind of this, he might encourage his government to stir up trouble in 
the region, already the site of a border dispute between the two countries.58 
What is particularly revealing is the central Ministry of State’s response to this missive.  
The Deputy Secretary in Delhi denied Kutch permission to stand apart from its 
neighbouring border zones, insisting that ‘we do not need to wait for the actual occurrence 
of serious incidents to create such a machinery in Kutch’. And ‘as for…the presence of an 
unreliable Muslim population, we feel that the visit of one or two officers for a meeting, 
which will be pre-arranged, will not in itself be a source of danger… Other security 
arrangements should be able to meet such dangers.’59 Note that the Deputy Secretary in 
Delhi did not challenge the Kutch Commissioner’s claim that ‘such dangers’ indeed 
existed, or question the assumption that the Muslim population was ‘unreliable’.  He took 
for granted the ‘fact’ that Muslim loyalty was shaky.  But he was clear that this was not in 
itself a ground to depart from established procedure.  
Here we catch another glimpse of the process of secularization at work.  Secularising 
institutional practice in one arena of government (inter-dominion relations and cross-
border migration in the east) could and did influence the official approach to very different 
                                                      
56 Farhana Ibrahim, Settlers, Saints and Sovereigns.  An Ethnography of State Formation in 
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issues in a very different region and level of governance.  So much so that the institutional 
practices set up by the Calcutta Agreement could reverse, at least in part, established 
aspects of border management in the west.  Practices agreed at exceptional moments of 
crisis by elites could spread, and eventually came to affect more quotidian, but nonetheless 
significant, ‘cultures of governance’ at more humdrum levels. This spread did not, 
however, represent an abandonment of communal stereotypes or ideologies on the part of 
the men who implemented them.  The two sets of dynamics, contrary though they were, 
existed side by side. 
*** 
 
Creating secularising practices that helped to promote peace and enable Indo-Pakistan 
cooperation was not, then, all about motherhood and apple pie. Nor was it incompatible 
with communal perceptions and conflict.  Cooperation between India and Pakistan drew 
heavily on their officials’ fear of anarchy and disorder, and their elites’ powerful and 
shared perception that the survival of both states, and the social order that sustained their 
own power, was threatened by uncontrolled flows of people across unmanageable borders. 
It thus drew eclectically upon a shared (but shifting) legacy of colonial bureaucratic mind-
sets and a common elite ‘habitus’.60 As Gould, Sherman and Ansari have noted, the 
transition to independence and partition created stresses that ‘altered conceptions of loyalty 
among government servants, particularly with respect to minorities and political 
opponents,’61 and these new perceptions cannot be ignored.  Yet remarkably, we find 
police in the borderlands slipping easily from seeing all crime as ‘communal’, to a familiar 
preoccupation with ‘bad characters’ (seen as habitually criminal individuals, distinct from 
‘bad religious communities’), ‘conniving villagers’ and ‘harbouring villages’ (as opposed 
to homogenous communal groups). From the fascinating vignettes that emerge from the 
archives, it seems that Indian and Pakistani elites high and low, who also had the role of 
agents of these states in their negotiations with each other, shared an unexamined 
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commitment to preserving social hierarchy and state authority by coercion, if necessary, 
and took it for granted that this was the ‘obvious’ thing to do. 
My aim in this essay has been to investigate the relationship between ‘critical’ or 
‘constitutive’ moments, and the long arc of history. If one can draw on these particular 
moments to make observations about longer processes of secularization, the first thing to 
be said is that they were ideologically incoherent.  Their ‘progress’, if one can so describe 
it, was piecemeal and illogical.  It had many rationales – whether to promote local order, 
bureaucratic efficiency, social hierarchy or elite interests – and they sometimes 
contradicted one another.  In one case, the imperative of orderly bureaucracy might trump 
local exception; in another, where the exception was more expedient, it trumped the rule. 
We get no sense of a clear linear progression in a single direction, towards a predetermined 
goal. Secularization involved differentiating between the state and the community, the 
community and the individual, national and regional interests, the community and class. 
But in the subcontinent’s post-partition crises, these differentiations did not occur in the 
same time, in the same way, with the same intention  – or indeed any coherent intent at all, 
other than the immediately and ‘obviously’ expedient. 
Reversals, too, were frequent.  Large parts of the Calcutta agreement 1948 did not endure 
for very long after the ink was dry.   Safeguarding the life, property, and cultural rights of 
minorities was observed more in the breach than in the substance62. In 1950, terrible 
rioting required a whole new agreement (the Nehru-Liaquat Pact) to be drawn up in 
another attempt to restore peace and stem migration.  Passports were introduced for cross-
border travel in 1952, and in 1965, the application of the Enemy Property Act of that year 
made a nonsense of the substantive goals of the 1948 Agreement.63  
Yet institutions, and bureaucratic practices, introduced in 1948, proved to be less 
ephemeral. The Evacuee Property Management Boards established in that year survived 
for decades, and cross-border consultative processes of this kind (such as Joint Riot 
Enquiry Commissions, Joint Border Working Groups, monthly inter-Dominion meetings, 
Provincial and District Minority Boards, and Inter-Dominion Consultative Committees) 
proliferated in the aftermath. Many of them have proved resilient.  When Willem van 
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Schendel conducted anthropological research in Bengal’s borderlands in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, he found that ‘in their pursuit of border stability, officials in border districts 
often quietly employed practices of cross-border co-operation and conflict management 
that flew in the face of the confrontational policies of territoriality employed by their 
superiors in the capital.’64  
If secularizing institutions were created with tenuous outcomes and contradictory purposes, 
peace between neighbouring states – and thus ‘the international order’ -- was sometimes 
the outcome of secularization.  However, peace was not necessarily the goal of any 
individual actor.  The protagonists in our story were, in one way or other, all agents of the 
state, and secularization occurred when they found it appropriate to place the interests of 
the state above the interests of their (religious) ‘community’ or ‘nation’. But often they 
were driven to do so more by threats to local order, or to their own social group, than by 
commitment to any abstract conception of the state, or the international order, or a peaceful 
South Asian neighbourhood.  
None of this is intended to suggest that conflict was no part of the relationship between 
India and Pakistan.  Of course it was.  Kashmir was already a huge bone of contention in 
the early months of 1948. Junagarh, Hyderabad, and the Indus Waters dispute would soon 
deeply compromise the fragile trust between these two nations.  But the point here is that 
both sides had developed a pragmatic understanding that each of these conflicts had to be 
resolved, or if that was not possible, at least contained.  Moreover, these areas of conflict 
must be understood alongside the very significant areas of agreement between the two 
sides. The contrapuntal relationship between the notorious disagreements which have 
dominated the conventional narrative on Indo-Pakistan affairs and their less well known, 
but arguably more substantial agreements, calls, as this essay has suggested, to be explored 
more fully, and to be better understood. 
(9,642 words including notes, appendices and title) 
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Appendix II 
Key legislation and agreements regarding refugees and evacuees in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh  1947-72 
 
Declarations establishing custodians of evacuee property India,  
September 1947 
Pakistan, September 1947 
 
 
Calcutta Inter-Dominion Conference, April 1948: 
agreements reached 
 to protect life and property of minorities 
 to safeguard their civic and cultural rights 
 to discourage propaganda for the amalgamation of India and Pak 
 to warn Govt servants against dereliction of duty towards minorities, towards 
creation of fear and apprehension in their minds 
 to curb tendencies towards economic boycott and strangulation of their normal 
life 
 Setting up of Evacuee Property Management Boards in districts or areas from 
which a substantial exodus had taken place 
 to postpone discussion of the  question of Muslim migration between Assam 
and East Bengal  to a separate Inter-Dominion. 
  Pending this, not to taken any action to force or precipitate migration to one 
province from the other on a mass scale  
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Joint Defence Council decision to establish the MEO India,  
September 1947 
Pakistan, September 1947 
Calcutta inter-dominion agreement India, April 1948 Pakistan, April 1948 
 
Permit ordinances 
 
India, 14 July 1948 Pakistan, 15 October 1948. 
Evacuee Property Ordinance: 
 
 
India, June 1948. 
 
 
 
Pakistan, October, 1949 
 
 
 
Karachi Agreement India, January 1949 Pakistan, January, 1949 
Evacuee Property Act: 
 
India, April 1950 Pakistan: April 1950 
Liaquat-Nehru Pact India, 1950 Pakistan, 1950 
Passports: 
 
India, October 1952 Pakistan, October 1952 
Displaced Persons (Compensation) Act: 
 
India, 1954 Pakistan, (NADRA rules) 1949-55 
Enemy Property Act India, 1968 (Ordinance) Pakistan, 1969 
 
Vested Property Ordinance  Bangladesh, 1972 
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Appendix III 
Protocol agreed between police officers in the event of border incidents 
 
 Exchange of First Information Reports and Daily Reports of all incidents of raids. 
 In the event of raids, police of both sides to exchange information, by wireless, where 
possible, or telegram. 
 ‘Earnest efforts’ to be made to recover stolen property.  ‘This is imperative in the case of 
abducted persons particularly women.’ 
 When a raider has been identified by name, ‘strong and effective action’ to be taken ‘to run 
him to earth’. 
 Exchange of lists of ‘notorious persons’ strong and effective action against ‘these individuals’.  
 Collective penal action ‘in the shape of collective fines or otherwise’ against villages 
conniving with border raids. 
 Superindents of Police (SPs) and their gazette officers to ‘keep an eye’ on ‘the harbourers of 
the raiders’. 
 Where possible, permanent permits to be issues to concerns SPs and gazetted officers to 
enable them to meet their opposite numbers without delay. 
 Warnings to be issued to all border police, village defence societies, national guards and 
troops ‘to refrain from giving any direct or indirect assistance to the raiders’. 
 Steps to be taken to publicize these decisions so that miscreants and raiders on both sides are 
aware that ‘adequate steps’ would be taken against them  
Source: ‘Instructions relating to meetings between police officers of Rajasthan and Pakistan to prevent 
border incidents’, NAI/MEA/36-15/49 Pak III. 
 
